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LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME III

1968

NUMBER 1

This is Part II in a series of articles reviewing the Wyoming
marriage statutes. Here Professor Rames continues his in depth analysis
of the statutes relating to the creation of the marriage relationship.
Areas of ambiguity, conflict and omission are indicated together with
the suggested court resolution and the future policy to be considered
in a revision of the law.

AN ANALYSIS OF WYOMING MARRIAGE
STATUTES, WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS
FOR REFORM -- PART II
John 0. Rames*

N Part

I of this article4 9 sections 20-1 to 20-5 of the Wyoming statutes of 1957 were analyzed in depth, both as to
form and substance, certain problems which they present were
pointed out, and various deficiencies were noted. This process
will be continued with section 20-6, which deals with the
circumstances under which the county clerk shall refuse to
issue a marriage license."
The preceding section, 20-5, pertains to the application
for and issuance of the license. As indicated in Part I, the
overall objective of the application should be to elicit all
information necessary to enable the county clerk to determine
whether the applicants are qualified, under Wyoming law,
to be married in this state; and to this end the information
should negative the possibility that the marriage would be
Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; LL.B. 1929, University of
Colorado; LL.M. 1958, University of Minnesota.
49. Rames, An Analysis of Wyoming Marriage Statutes, With Some Suggestions for Reform-Part 1, 2 LAND & WATERt L. REV. 182 (1967).
50. WYo. STAT. § 20-6 (1957) states:
If, on such testimony being given, it shall appear that either of the
parties is legally incompetent to enter into such contract according
to the law of the state of their residence and of this state, or that
there is any impediment in the way; or if either party is a minor and
the consent hereinbefore mentioned shall not be given, the said clerk
shall refuse to grant a license.
*
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either void or voidable if performed in Wyoming. Assurance
was given in Part I that in the proposed legislation hereinafter set out a form of application for marriage license
would be included. If these responsibilities are properly
discharged, the county clerk's task of determining whether
the applicants are entitled to a license under Wyoming law
should be comparatively easy.
It was also proposed in Part I that the clerk be relieved
of the burden now imposed upon him to ascertain "whether
there be any legal impediment to the parties entering into
the marriage contract according to the laws of the state of
their residence" if it is other than Wyoming. In the light
of these changes in Section 20-5, the following section could
provide simply that if, upon examination of the application
and any information (such as proof of age) supplementary
thereto, it shall appear to the county clerk that a marriage
between the applicants would be either void or voidable if
performed in Wyoming, he shall refuse to issue the license;
otherwise he shall issue it, dating it on the day of issuance.
In addition, Section 20-6 should allow for a situation (discussed in Part I) in which a district judge under special
circumstances directs the county clerk to accept the written
consent of a person other than a living father when an
applicant under 21 is involved. If these suggestions are
followed, Section 20-6 would not contain language imposing
upon the county clerk the duty of ascertaining whether there
is a legal impediment to the prospective marriage, but only
the duty of ascertaining whether it would be either void or
voidable; and other statutes would specify what sorts of
marriage would be void or voidable if performed in Wyoming.
Sections 20-7 to 20-9 require applicants for marriage
licenses to produce health certificates, serological tests for
syphilis, and under certain circumstances additional laboratory reports concerning venereal disease. They make it unlawful for persons afflicted with venereal diseases of certain
types and in cetrain stages to marry, and prescribe criminal
penalties for violations. The laudable objective of these sections (as pointed out in Part I) is to insure healthy marriages
and healthy offspring so far as venereal disease is concerned.
If these statutes are to be retained, some rearrangement
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss1/9
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would seem desirable. Since the certificates and reports are
required at the time application is made for the license,
Section 20-71 logically should precede rather than follow
20-6, and the wording of 20-7 which ties it in with the application could be improved upon. Section 20-8"2 could be
combined with 20-7 as the opening sentence thereof. Section
20-9"3 prescribes criminal sanctions for Sections 20-7, 20-8,
and 35-183, the last mentioned requiring physicians in
attendance at births to administer antibiotic eye drops to
newly born children. It is submitted that such portion of
20-9 as pertains to 35-183 should be combined with the latter
and eliminated from the marriage statutes. As to the remainder of 20-9, the problem of criminal sanctions for violation
of the marriage statutes will be considered as a whole at a
later stage of this article; for the time being, therefore, disposition of Section 20-9 will be held in a state of suspended
animation.
51. WYO. STAT. § 20-7 (1957) reads as follows:
Every male and female person securing a marriage license must
produce a certificate dated within thirty (30) days before the date
of application for such marriage license from a physician licensed
to practice in this state or any other state or in any territory of
the United States, or the District of Columbia, or by a commissioned
medical officer on active duty with the armed forces of the United
States or with the public health service, showing applicant to be free
from any venereal disease in a communicable stage. Such certificate
shall include or be accompanied by a report of a standard approved
serological test for syphilis from a laboratory authorized for this
purpose by the Wyoming state board of health or the corresponding
public health authority having jurisdiction in the area where such
tests are performed. It shall further include or be accompanied by
the report of a laboratory examination for other venereal disease as
indicated by the physical examination.
A physician, duly licensed under the laws of the State of Wyoming
and engaged in practice therein, may submit to the person authorized
by law to issue marriage licenses, in lieu of such certificate, a statement over such physician's signature that the female applicant for
the license is near the termination of her pregnancy or the death of
one or both applicants is imminent and that he has taken blood samples adequate for serological testing from such applicant or applicants,
and forwarded same to the Wyoming department of health laboratory,
in which case a certificate shall not be required of such applicant prior
to issuance of a license.
52. WYO. STAT. § 20-8 (1957) indicates:
It shall be unlawful for any person having syphilis, gonococcus infection or chancroid in an infectious stage, or having syphilis in a stage
of said disease whereby the same could be transmitted to the issue of
said infected person, to contract marriage or enter the marriage
relationship within this state.
53. WYo. STAT. § 20-9 (1957) provides:
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of sections 14
[§ 35-1831, 15 r§ 20-8] and 16 [§ 20-71, or shall wilfully or knowingly
make any misstatements or false certificates as to any facts required
by the provisions of sections 14, 15 and 16, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not to exceed one thousand dollars or imprisonment not to exceed one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
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The three statutes, 20-7 to 20-9, were first enacted in
1921. Section 20-7 was later amended in 1943 and 1955. As
originally enacted 20-7 was limited to male persons, and
required a physician's certificate of freedom "from any
venereal disease in a communicable stage" before a marriage
license could be issued, only Wyoming physicians could give
the certificate, and it could be dated not earlier than 10
days before the application for the license. In 1943 the
legislature expanded Section 20-7 to include females, extended
the permissible date of the certificate to 30 days before the
license application, and required the report of a standard
serological test for syphilis and the report of a laboratory
examination for any other venereal disease indicated by the
physical examination. In 1955 the section was further expanded in minor particulars to its present form.
It will be noted that, as in the case of the requirement
of parental consent for marriage of a minor, 4 there is no
language in Sections 20-7 to 20-9 indicating what may be
the effect upon the validity of the marriage if for some
reason the physician's certificate and reports of tests are
not supplied at the time the license is applied for. Section
20-8 does provide that "it shall be unlawful" for any person
having certain venereal diseases in certain stages to contract
marriage, but it still stops short of branding such a marriage
void. As indicated in Part I of this article there are no
decisions of the Supreme Court of Wyoming on this point,
and on the basis of case authority from other jurisdictions
we concluded that the marriage would be valid, or at worst
voidable.5 5 Adopting the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Nebraska in the Chkristensen case,"6 we recommended that
such a marriage be classified as voidable, and that this should
be expressly stated in a statute. 7
But, despite their praiseworthy objective, there is some
question as to whether Sections 20-7 to 20-9 should be retained
at all. The Director of the Wyoming Department of Public
Health, Dr. Robert Alberts, has recently expressed the opinion
54.

WYO. STAT. § 20-3 (1957).

55. Rames, supra note 49, at 187.
56. Christensen v. Christensen, 144 Neb. 763, 14 N.W.2d 613 (1944).
57. Rames, supra note 49, at 188.
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that these statutes are of little value. 8 Dr. Alberts pointed
out that syphilis is the only one of the various venereal
diseases which at present can be detected by means of a
serological test, and that it is often difficult to diagnose
the other venereal diseases (especially in women) by physical
examination. Consequently, in Wyoming-as elsewherephysicians rely basically on the results of the laboratory
serological test for syphilis in executing the certificate of
freedom "from any venereal disease in a communicable
stage" required by Section 20-7. No charge is made for the
standard serological test when conducted by the Wyoming
state laboratory; the specimens, however, are obtained by
private physicians who may make a charge for their services.
Dr. Alberts recalled that in the State of Washington, where
similar procedures were in force, a study during the early
sixties 'disclosed that the cost of identifying communicable
syphilis by this means was approximately $4,000 per case;
thus it cannot be justified solely as a convenient method of
detecting syphilis in the population. Other epidemiological
methods have proved to be more successful and much less
expensive. Discussing the matter of a general physical examination of a marriage license applicant being mandatory, and
made available in the interests of protection to the other
prospective marriage partner, Dr. Alberts questioned the
validity of the basic assumption that the state has a duty to
protect the parties to a prospective marriage from each other:
the requirement smacks more of the type of officious interference in personal relations characteristic of a police state.
On the other hand, if the primary object of the statutes is
to prevent the transmission of venereal disease to offspring,
a more effective control could be found, in Dr. Alberts'
opinion, by prenatal examinations of all prospective mothers,
followed by remedial measures when venereal disease is
detected or suspected. And finally, Dr. Alberts considers
Sections 20-8 and 20-9 to be of very limited value, if any,
as deterrents.
On the basis of this thoughtful analysis of Sections 20-7
to 20-9 by the Director of the Department of Public Health
58. Personal interview with the writer, September 19, 1967.
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of Wyoming, it is fair to conclude that these sections should
be eliminated altogether.
We move next to Section 20-10"9 which relates to the
performance of a marriage ceremony by an authorized celebrant. In Part I of this article we concluded that this section
should make it clear (although it does not now do so) that
the requirement of a ceremony is mandatory, ° and that the
classes of celebrants named in the section are exclusive except
as may be modified by Section 20-20, which provides that
marriages performed according to the rites and customs of
"any religious society" shall be valid. 1 There is little variation from state to state with respect to the classes of persons
authorized to perform marriage ceremonies, 2 and our statute
is typical of inland states. The 'description seems clear: e.g.,
"every judge" would include a municipal judge and a
supreme court justice. If the inferior court system of Wyoming should be changed (as may soon come about) and the
title "justice of the peace" be changed to something else, such
as "magistrate", an amendment would be necessary; but
probably we should not cross such a bridge before we come
to it. It is interesting to note that at least one court has
held that a Jehovah's Witness is a "minister" within the
meaning of a statute similar to section 20-10."
What is the impact of Section 20-20 upon Section 20-10,
and what should be their relative positions in the statute
book? If the former is intended to modify the latter, it
would be logical to combine the two in Section 20-10, adding
20-20 as a proviso following what is now 20-10. There is
currently quite a problem in determining what is a "reli59.

60.
61.

62.
63.

WYo. STAT. § 20-10 (1957) provides that: "Every judge, and every court
commissioner of any district court of this state, every justice of the peace,
and every licensed or ordained minister of the gospel, may perform the
ceremony of marriage in this state."
Rames, supra note 49, at 189.
Id. This section reads as follows:
It shall be lawful for any religious society or religious assembly to
perform the ceremony of marriage in this state according to the rites
and customs of such society or religious assembly and the clerk or
keeper of the minutes, proceedings, or other book of the religious
society or religious assembly wherein such marriage shall be had, or
if there be no such clerk or keeper of the minutes, then the moderator
or person presiding in such society or religious assembly, shall make
out and trasmit to the county clerk of the county, a certificate of the
marriage, and the same shall be recorded in like manner as hereinbefore provided.
55 C.J.S. Marriage § 29, at 862 (1948).
State ex reL Hayes v. O'Brien, 160 Ohio St. 170, 114 N.E.2d- 729 (1953).
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and it would no doubt be helpful if we could come

up with language in 20-20 more specific than "any religious
society", but it is doubtful that we can without creating
more problems than we would solve. It has been suggested
that the county clerks be surveyed with respect to various
problems presented by the marriage statutes, and as part of
the survey they could be asked whether they have encountered
any difficulties connected with 20-20.
Section 20-116" must also be taken into account in connection with 20-20. We must ask here, as we did with 20-10,
whether it was intended that 20-20 should modify 20-11; or,
to put it the other way, whether it was intended that ceremonies by which religious societies unite people in marriage
shall meet the minimum specifications of 20-11: a declaration
of the parties, made in the presence of the celebrant and at
least two witnesses, that they take each other as husband and
wife. The problem of statutory construction which is involved
is complex, but need not be solved: what is necessary is to
decide whether we want the marriage ceremonies of religious
societies comprehended by 20-20 to meet the minimum specifications of 20-11 and to conform to 20-10 as far as celebrants
are concerned, then to phrase the three sections so that they
will clearly implement such decisions. The fact that the
legislature amended and re-enacted 20-20 in 19676" without
reference to 20-10 or 20-11 seems to indicate a legislative
intent that 20-20 shall not be limited by 20-10 and 20-11, and

that view of the matter will be adopted by the revision hereinafter proposed. What is now 20-20 will be added to 20-10
as a proviso, and 20-11 will except from its requirements

ceremonies performed according to the rites of religious
societies.
Parenthetically, it may be said that contemporary developements suggest interesting questions pertaining to Section
Cf. Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection-"Religion" in the Law, 73
YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964); Fellowship of Humanity v. Alameda, 153 Cal.
App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957); Lefkowitz v. Burden, 252 N.Y.S.2d 715
(1964).
65. This section provides that: "In the solemnization of marriage, no particular
form shall be required, except that the parties shall solemnly declare in
the presence of the person performing the ceremony, and the attending
witnesses, that they take each other as husband and wife, and in any case
there shall be at least two witnesses."
66. Ch. 108, [1967] Wjo. SEss. LAws 126.
64.
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20-20; for example, would a "Hippie" marriage ceremony
performed in Wyoming constitute a valid marriage?
With further reference to Section 20-11, we concluded
in Part I of this article that the observance of the mininumn
ceremonial requirements of this section should be mandatory
(except as modified by Section 20-20).7 This should be more
clearly indicated than appears from the existing language
of 20-11.
But the most interesting question presented by this section is whether, in view of its present wording, there could
be a valid marriage if one or both parties are not physically
present before the celebrant. Putting it in another way, are
proxy marriages and marriages by telephone or radio valid
in Wyoming?
The dynamics of living in today's world have led to ever
increasing pressures to legalize proxy, telephone and radio
marriages. Swift communication, personal situations which
change drastically overnight, and the presence of many young
men in the armed forces are factors which make such pressures understandable. Typically, at least one of the parties
to the prospective marriage would be physically present in
Wyoming, and under our existing statutes could lawfully
obtain a marriage license without the actual presence of the
other. It would be a rare case in which both parties would
be absent from the place of the celebrant's physical presence
in Wyoming and yet would request him to perform a ceremony by proxies, telephone or radio. It seems to, us that
if "absentee marriages" are to be permitted at all, there
should be a requirement that one of the parties must be in
Wyoming in the physical presence of the celebrant when the
ceremony is performed; there ought to be this much nexus
between the State of Wyoming and the creation of a marriage
status by virtue of the laws of this state.
In a proxy marriage the changes of fraud are minimal.
In the negotiation and consummation of commercial contracts
it is commonplace that one and sometimes both parties are
represented by agents. Contractually speaking, a proxy marriage is nothing more nor less than the formation of a con67. Rames, supra note 49, at 190.
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tract through an agent. Normally the proxy holds a written
power of attorney, so that the assent of the absent party and
the identity of the agent present no peculiar problems.
But opportunities for fraud are obviously present in
marriage by radio or telephone. Here, the identity of the
absent party depends upon recognition of a voice. Except
rarely the celebrant would not be thoroughly enough acquainted with such party to recognize his voice, and would necessarily be forced to depend upon the assurance of the other
party physically present, who might be deceived by an
imposter who was a good mimic. In addition there is the
possibility of mechanical difficulty-static, a poor telephone
connection, and the like. Although it takes time to arrange
proxies, it is difficult to visualize a situation where there
would be so much urgency about the marriage that proxies
would be impractical. If the foregoing premises are correct,
we reject the suggestion that our statute legalize marriages
by telephone and radio, and we would state the proxy marriage issue as follows: Is it desirable to permit proxy marriages to be performed by celebrants located in _Wyoming,
one prospective spouse being in the physical presence of
the celebrant, and provided that there has been full compliance with all other statutory requisites for a valid ceremonial marriage 7
At the outset it should be said that on the basis of case
authority it is probable that under existing statutes a proxy
marriage performed in Wyoming would be voidable, assuming compliance with all other statutory requisites for ceremonial marriage.Y In states which recognize common law
marriages a proxy marriage can often be sustained as a
common law marriage, depending upon what must be proved
in each particular state to establish such a marriage; for
example, some states require cohabitation and reputation and
others do not. None of the cases cited in footnote 68 dealt
with jurisdictions which recognize common law marriage; in
other words, the proxy marriage had to be sustained as a
ceremonial marriage or not at all.
68.

Barrons v. Unite d States., 191 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Respole v. Respole,
34 Ohio Ops. 1, 70 N.E.2d 465 (1946); State v. Anderson, 239 Ore. 200,
396 P.2d 558 (1964).
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A New York decision held that proxy marriages performed in the District of Columbia are entirely valid. 9 (The court
sustained the marriage as a common law marriage as well,
such marriages being recognized in the District.)
Barronsv. United States" is the leading case. It involved
the validity of a proxy marriage performed in Nevada in 1944,
at which time common law marriages were invalid there.
Both parties were members of the armed forces. The woman,
who was domiciled in Texas but physically present in Reno
during the ceremony, was pregnant by the man, who was
stationed in Africa and domiciled in California. She informed
him of her pregnancy and they agreed to be married. He
was represented at the ceremony by a member of the Red
Cross, who had been given a written power of attorney for
him for this purpose. With the exception of the proxy
feature, all statutory requirements for a ceremonial marriage
were complied with. The ceremony was performed on July
20, 1944, and the husband (H) was killed in action one week
later. The wife (W) claimed the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance policy on H's life, and she was opposed
by H's father, who contended that the proxy marriage was
void and that he was entitled to the policy as H's next of
kin. The action, in the nature of interpleader, was instituted
by the federal government in a U.S. District Court in
California.
The District Court held in favor of W' 1 and the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In the latter
opinion the reasoning was as follows: If the marriage was
not invalid in Nevada, both Texas and California would
recognize it unless proxy marriages were in conflict with
their strong public policy. There were, said the court, no
Texas or California decisions on the subject, but "All states
which have passed on this question have recognized the
validity of proxy marriages validly performed elsewhere." 7 2
In support the court cited a number of references to text69. Ferraro v. Ferraro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1948), aff'd sub nom. Fernandes v.
Fernandes, 87 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1949).
70. Barrons v. United States, 8upra note 68.
71. United States v. Barrons, 91 F. Supp. 319 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1950).
72. Barrons v. United States, supro note 68, at 95.
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books, law review articles, and Section 124 of the Restatement
of Conflict of Laws.
There were no Nevada decisions on the validity of proxy
marriages performed there. The heart of the problem, according to the opinion, was the interpretation of Section 122.110 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. This statute is substantially identical to Section 20-11 of the existing Wyoming
statutes. The pertinent provisions as the court saw them
were that ".

.

. the parties shall declare, in the presence of

the judge, minister, or magistrate, and the attending witnesses, that they take each other as husband and wife.''"
People can "declare" through an agent as well as in person,
in the court's opinion, although it agreed that" Superficially,
the statute could be construed to require that the declaration
be made by the parties personally ....

""

The court found

support for its interpretation in the additional language of
Section 122.110 of the Nevada statute that "In the solemnization of marriage no particular form shall be required."
As supporting its conclusion the opinion cited the Respole"
6 cases, adding that these were the only two
and Fernandes"
decisions on the validity of proxy marriages 'disclosed by
research, but observing that in neither of the jurisdictions
concerned (West Virginia in Respole and the District of
Columbia in Fernandes) was there a statute establishing
minimum essentials for a ceremonial marriage. And finally,
the court in the Barrons case noted that in Nevada only one
party to the prospective marriage was required to apply for
the license. With respect to the status of the Nevada proxy
marriage, the court said, "The most that could be said of it
is that it rendered the marriage voidable.""7 There was no
explanation of why the marriage was characterized as voidable rather than valid. The ultimate decision was that since
it was voidable, and since one party to it (H) was dead, his
father had no standing to attack its validity.
The Ninth Circuit decision in Barrons harmonized with
the U.S. District Court decision in the case"8 but the latter
73. Id. at 96 (Emphasis supplied by the court).
74. Id.
75. Respole v. Respole, supra note 68.
76. Fernandes v. Fernandes, supra note 69.
77. Barrons v. United States, supra note 68, at 99.

78. United States v. Barrons, supra note 71.
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relied in addition upon Section 122.090, which is substantially
identical to Wyoming Section 20-16.
The most recent case on the validity of proxy marriages
appears to be State v. Anderson," a 4-3 decision of the
Supreme Court of Oregon in 1964. The majority, relying
heavily on Barrons, held that a proxy marriage performed
in Oregon was voidable. All other statutory requirements
for a ceremonial marriage had been fulfilled.
M

In Oregon, as in Nevada, common law marriages were
invalid, the statutes permitted the application for the marriage license to be made by one of the parties only, and
the statute or the form of ceremony was substantially the
same as Wyoming Section 20-11; Ore. Rev. Stats. Section
106.150 provided in part that "the parties thereto shall assent
or 'declare in the presence of the minister . . . solemnizing
the marriage ... that they take each other to be husband
and wife."
The Anderson opinion is a comprehensive one. Here, as
in Barrons, the merits and demerits of proxy marriages are
discussed. (In this article such discussion will be reserved
for that part in which legislative changes in our marriage
statutes are proposed; at the moment, the point we are making
is that on the basis of case authority a proxy marriage performed in Wyoming would not be void.)
Pointing out that the Oregon statute was silent as to
whether the assent or declaration of the parties could be made
by agent, that proxy marriages were valid at common law,
and that there is nothing about a proxy marriage which
offends public policy, the Anderson majority held that such
marriages performed in Oregon are voidable and cannot be
attacked by a third person. Assuming but not deciding (said
the court) that the marriage was not entirely valid, because
the act of a proxy will not satisfy the statutory requirement
that the parties shall assent or declare in the presence of the
celebrant, the defect did not render it void."0 This mode of
reasoning seems peculiar.
The dissenters concentrated on the phrase "in the pre79. State v. Anderson, supra note 68.
80. Id. at 560.
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sence of" in Section 106.150, arguing that these words required personal presence, and that such requirement was
mandatory. The dissenting judges charged that the majority
had added to the list of voidable marriages one of a type
not so designated by the legislature, and thus were guilty of
judicial legislation. They concluded that proxy marriages
are void.
The value of the Respole8 ' and Fernandes"'cases is weakened by the fact that in neither jurisdiction involved (West
Virginia and the District of Columbia, respectively) was
there a statute like Wyoming Section 20-11 specifying minimum requirements for a marriage ceremony; there was no
statute containing the "in the presence of" phraseology.
The few cases which hold that proxy marriages are void
construe statutes in which there is language explicitly requiring both parties to be in the physical presence of the
celebrant."
As already indicated, discussion of the pros and cons
of proxy marriages (as well as text and law review material)
will be reserved for later discussion. The subject is of considerable importance since, as one authority observed, "during World War II several thousand proxy marriages occurred . . .'
" and the primary reason-many young men
overseas in miltary service-still exists. For the moment,
suffice it to say that the wording of Section 20-11 of the
Wyoming marriage statutes should be altered at least to
the extent necessary to clarify the status of proxy, telephone
and radio marriages performed in this state.
Research has not disclosed any reported cases involving
the validity of marirages by telephone, radio or similar means
of communication. Newspaper reports of such marriages
appear from time to time, and the indications are that for
the most part such marriages fall in the category of
"stunts".
We have already taken the position that such
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Respole v. Respole, supra note 68.
Fernandes v. Fernandes, supra note 69.
See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 947 (1947).
Id.
Howery, Marriage by Proxy and other Informal Marriages, 13 U.K.C.L.
REV. 48 (1944).
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marriages should not receive the blessing of Wyoming law,
and Section 20-11 should make this clear.
One could hardly be "in the presence of" the celebrant
if only his voice were present. This conclusion is supported
by an opinion of the Attorney General of Wyoming rendered
under date of November 12, 1953.' The Attorney General
considered that what is now Section 20-11 was determinative
of the question, and that a man in Germany who proposed
to marry a woman in Wyoming by telephone could not be
"in the presence" of the celebrant under those circumstances.
He added that he believed that express legislative authorization of such marriages "would be in the public interest".
A further suggestion: As a matter of practice, the marriage license is delivered to the celebrant by the parties
desiring to be married (it being his authority for performing
the ceremony), but the opening sentence of Section 20-11
should specifically require this.
Under existing law a marirage license once obtained is
valid for an indefinite time. Perhaps a limitation should be
imposed, especially if the requirements for health certificates, serological tests, etc. are retained, since the protection
provided thereby would obviously decrease with the passage
of time. If the parties abandoned their plans to marry the
absence of a time limit might encourage the fraudulent use
of the license by imposters who lack legal capacity to marry.
The opinions of county clerks, ministers and other interested
persons as to a reasonable time limitation could be sampled.
The limitation appropriately could be expressed in Section
20-11.
The analysis of Section 20-11 having been completed, let
us go on to Section 20-12 s" which deals with the preparation
and delivery of the marriage certificate to the parties. Several minor changes would improve this statute. Since it
86. 1953 Op. Wyo. Arr'Y. GEN. 71.
87. This section provides:
When a marriage shall have been solemnized pursuant to the provisions
of this chapter [§§ 20-1 to 20-6, 20-10 to 20-17, 20-20, 20-21], the
person performing the ceremony, shall give each of the parties, on
request, a certificate under his hand, specifying the names, ages, and
place of residence of the parties married, the names and residence of
at least two witnesses who were present at such marriage, and the

time and place thereof.
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seems to be invariable practice for celebrants to make out
and deliver marriage certificates to the parties and to the
county clerk, the words "on request" should be deleted.
Every one who is married should be given a marriage certificate-whether he chooses to retain it or to dispose of it
is for him to decide. This section should require the celebrant
to prepare and sign three originals of the marriage certificate,
and to deliver or mail one to each of the parties and the third
to the county clerk of the county of issuance, within ten days
following the performance of the ceremony. Furthermore,
the opinions of the county clerks should be sought as to
whether the information presently required to be entered
on the certificate is adequate. If additional information is
desirable, the statute relating to the application for the
license should be amplified accordingly, so that the celebrant
will have the necessary information before him when he
prepares the marriage certificate. If proxy marriages are
to be permitted, provision should be made in Section 20-12
to include that fact and the name of the proxy. Language
making allowance for the performance of ceremonies by
religious societies should also be included.
Sections 35-70 to 35-72,88 which appear in Title 35 (Public
Health and Safety) tie in with Section 20-12 although there
is no mention of this in the latter statute. Sections 35-70 to
35-72 seem out of place in Title 35. They do not direct the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics to do anything; their
directions are confined to celebrants of marriages and to
county clerks. They could well be omitted from Title 35.
Moreover, in view of what we have already proposed as to
20-12, 35-70 and 35-71 can be eliminated entirely. The substance of 35-72 can be incorporated into Section 20-13, which
provides that "The county clerk of each county in the state
88. WYO. STAT. § 35-70 (1957)

provides:

Every officiant of a marriage ceremony performed in this state shall
prepare and sign a certificate of marriage in duplicate, one copy of
which shall be given to the parties so married, and the other copy to
be filed in accordance with section 24 of this act [§ 35-71].
WYo. STAT. § 35-71 (1957) provides:
Every person who performs a marriage ceremony in this state
shall file, within ten (10) days after the ceremony, one copy of the
certificate of marriage with the officer who issued the marriage license.
WYo. STAT. § 35-72 (1957) provides:
Every officer authorized to issue marriage licenses shall forward
on or before the fifteenth day of each calendar month the certificates
of marriage which were filed with him during the preceding calendar
month, to the state registrar.
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shall record all such returns of such marriages in a book to
be kept for that purpose, within one month after receiving
the same." This one month time period should be synchronized
with the time specified in 35-72, since there could be a conflict
as matters now stand. It is suggested that the latter be
changed to read "within 15 days after he (the couny clerk)
records the marriage certificate". In Title 35, in substitution
for 35-70 to 35-72, there should be a statute directing the
Registrar of Vital Statistics to file and make a record of
marriage certificates received from county clerks. ("Make
a record of" is included with a view to the compilation of
statistics.) Former Section 35-73 was repealed by the legislature, 9 since the recording fee is covered elsewhere.
In line with our suggestions as to Section 20-12, the
words "all marriage certificates received by him from persons or religious societies authorized to perform marriage
ceremonies" should be substituted for "all such returns of
such marriages" in Section 20-13.9"
The next section, 20-14,91 could also be improved in minor
particulars. It is confusing to speak of an original certificate
and record of marriage made by a celebrant. The record of
the marriage would appear to be the entry made in the
marriage book by the county clerk. Thus the section might
well be rephrased to read, "Any one of the original certificates of marriage prepared and signed by a person or representative of a religious society authorized by this chapter
to perform marriage ceremonies, and any record of the
marriage appearing in the office of the county clerk, or a
copy of such record duly certified by the county clerk, shall
be received in all courts and places as presumptive evidence
of the fact of such marriage." Since people frequently
record their marriage certificates, the words "any record
of the marriage appearing in the office of the county clerk"
89. Ch. 106, § 4, [1965] WYo. SEss. LAws 130.
90. This section provides: "The county clerk of each county in the state shall
record all such returns of such marriages in a book to be kept for that
purpose, within one month after receiving the same."
91. WYo. STAT. § 20-14 (1957) reads as follows:
The original certificate and record of marriage made by the minister,
officer or person, as prescribed in this chapter [§§ 20-1 to 20-6, 20-10
to 20-17, 20-20, 20-21], and the record thereof made as prescribed, or
a copy of such record duly certified by such officer, shall be received
in all courts and places as presumptive evidence of the fact of such
marriage,
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were chosen because they would include both the record in
the marriage book and a recorded marriage certificate.
The problem of sanctions to be imposed for violation of
the marriage statutes will be considered as a whole at the
conclusion of this analysis-consequently we shall at present
omit discussion of Section 20-15.
Logic suggests that what is now Section 20-162 should
follow the combination of 20-10 and 20-20 which we discussed
hereinabove. Section 20-16 tells us in effect that the validity
of a marriage performed by justices of the peace or ministers
shall not be affected by a "flaw in the title" of such justice
or minister, if at least one of the persons so married entertains a "full belief" that the marriage was valid. This is
a desirable curative statute, but minor changes would be
in order. Why not include judges and court commissioners
as well as justices and ministers, and celebrants representing
a religious society or assembly under 20-20? The section
should cover all celebrants. "Want of jurisdiction or authority" would seem to be broad enough to cover all defects which
the statute seeks to reach, including a situation such as
occurred in the well known case of Travers v. Reinhardt"
where the husband, without the wife's knowledge, arranged
for the ceremony to be performed by a friend of his, who was
not a minister but who masqueraded as such. Out of an
abundance of caution, perhaps the phrase should read "want
of qualification, jurisdictions or authority".
Here for the first time we encounter in our marriage
statutes the phrase "provided, the marriage be consummated
..... " When we speak of the "consummation" of a marriage
any one of three 'different meanings may be intended: (1)
the mere completion of the marriage ceremony, 4 or (2) a
ceremony followed by sexual intercourse," or (3) the mutual
92. This section provides that:
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to be a justice
of the peace or a minister of the gospel, shall be deemed or adjudged
to be void, nor shall the validity thereof be in any way affected, on
account of any want of jurisdiction or authority in such supposed
justice or minister; provided, the marriage be consummated with a
full belief on the part of the persons so married, or either of them,
that they have been lawfully joined in marriage.
93. Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423 (1906).
94. Lefkoff v. Sicro, 189 Ga. 554, 6 S.E.2d 687, 695 (1939).
95. Caruso v. Caruso, 104 N.J. Eq. 588, 146 A. 649, 651 (1929).
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assumption of marital rights, duties and obligations, not
necessarily limited to (1) or (2)."' Any of the three meanings could have been intended by the legislature in Section
20-16. The first meaning seems the most sensible in this
case, and the language of 20-16 should be clarified so as to
reflect it.
One final suggestion in connection with this section:
"bona fide belief" on the part of the persons so married, or
either of them, would be preferable to "full belief".
The next section, 20-17," forbids the solemnization of
marriages which are declared void "by the divorce law of
this state". The reference would seem to be to Section 20-32
which appears in the chapter on "Divorce, Annulment and
Alimony" and which enumerates void marriages. Since the
reference is somewhat uncertain, and is unnecessary in any
event, it should be deleted. At first blush the statute seems
to be directed primarily at people who are authorized to
perform marriage ceremonies, but the underlying purpose
is undoubtedly to lay the basis for imposing sanctions upon
everyone who in any way participates in unlawful marriages:
the parties, the county clerk, the celebrant--even the physician who supplies an untrue certificate of freedom from
venereal disease. If this analysis is sound, then voidable
as well as void marriages should be included (since both are
unlawful) and the requirement of scienter should be added.
A celebrant should not be punished for innocently solemnizing an unlawful marriage, nor a county clerk for innocently
issuing a marriage license in ignorance of a legal impediment
to a valid marriage, and so on. We have already recommended
that our statutes expressly identify and define void and
voidable marriages. The substance of Section 20-17 could
be set out as the opening sentence of the statute or statutes
which provide sanctions for the knowing violation of the
marriage code-probably at the end of the code.
Sections 20-18 and 20-19 were repealed by the 1965
legislature. 8 So-called miscegenation statutes of this kind
were recently 'declared by the U.S. supreme court to violate
96. Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633, 22 P.26, 37 (1889).
97. The statute provides that: "Marriages that are declared void by the
divorce law of this state shall in no case be solemnized."
98. Ch. 4, § 1, [1965] WYo. SESs. LAWS 3.
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the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, 9 so
it is unnecessary to give any thought to their possible reinstatement.
We have already worked over Section 20-20. This brings
us, then, to the final statute in the article on the creation of
the marriage relationship-section 20-21.11° This statute deals
very briefly with the conditions under which the State of
Wyoming will recognize the validity of marriages performed
or created outside the state. At first blush, the use of the
word "country" would lead us to believe that the section does
not apply to sister-state marriages. Nevertheless, an identical
California statute was construed as including sister-state
marriages. 1 ' The wording should be amended in order to
make clear the legislative intent that the statute is to apply
to all marriages contracted outside the state. Secondly, the
term "marriage contracts without this state" could be improved upon.
We may observe that the statute is limited to marriages
valid where performed, which would not include voidable
marriages. Is this desirable? I think it is; why should we
recognize as valid here a marriage which was merely voidable where performed? In order to make it clear that validity
isto be judged as of the time the marriage is contracted, it
would be well to use the words "were valid" rather than
"would be valid".
These minor matters out of the way, we should next
consider whether the statute is an adequate statement of the
specific conflict of laws rule which it adopts, and whether
this rule is the best of the various conflict of laws rules
available for legislative selection. Section 20-21 is an expression of what may be called "the orthodox conflict of laws
rule", stated as follows by the writer in C.J.S. :102
"The general rule is that the validity of a marriage
is determined by the law of the place where it was
contracted; if valid there it will be held valid
everywhere, and, conversely, if invalid by the lex
99. Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967).
100. "All marriage contracts without this state, which would be valid by the
laws of the country in which the same were contracted, shall be valid
in all courts and places in this state." WYO. STAT. § 20-21 (1957).
101. McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 58 P.2d 163 (1936).
102. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 4, at 811 (1948).
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loci contractus, it will be held invalid wherever
the question may arise."
This rule was adopted by the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws.. and is in force in the majority of jurisdictions.
Universally an exception to this rule exists. It is variously stated, but the following from an A.L.R. annotation'.
puts it very well:
While there are to be found some dicta in the American decisions, and possibly some actual English decisions, seemingly favoring the rule that the capacity
of the parties, as contradistinguished from the formal
or ceremonial requirements of the marriage, is to
be tested according to the law of the domicil, no
matter where the marriage is celebrated, the decisions, in the American cases at least, refusing to
recognize foreign marriages on grounds other than
lack of ceremonial or formal requisites are generally
predicable on the fundamental public policy against
the celebration of such a marriage, of the forum
(whether of the domicil or of some third state) in
which the validity of the marriage has come in
question.
This is a more accurate way to put it than the more usual
statement that "an exception thereto exists where the marriage is repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of
the parties . . .""' the domicile of the parties ordinarily
(but not necessarily) being the forum. The question left
open by this latter form of statement is, "Domicile of the
parties at the time of the marriage, or domicile when the
law suit is begun?" The last mentioned is almost always
the forum state, while the former could be any place.
As indicated in the A.L.R. quotation supra there is
another conflict of laws rule which seems to be followed in
England and possibly some of the American states: that lex
loci contractus is applied to determine the validity of the
marriage so far as its ceremonial or formal requisites are
concerned, whereas capacity of the parties to marry is to
be determined by the law of their domiciles at the time the
103. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1934).
104. Annot., 127 A.L.R. 437 (1940) ; see also, 11 OKLA. L. R. 305 (1958).
105. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 4, at 813 (1948).
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marriage is contracted." 6 The leading English case exemplifying what may be called the "'domicile rule" is Brook v.
Brook."0 7
A third possibility is the adoption of a "marriage evasion policy" by statute or court decision. In brief, this rule
is that if parties domiciled in State A go to State B and are
married, with the intent to evade the marriage laws of State
A and the intent to return to State A, the marriage being
valid in State B but void if performed in State A, the result
is a void marriage. In 1912 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the "Uniform Marriage Evasion Act" expressing this policy. Only a
few states adopted it (five as of 1961) and for this reason the
Conference withdrew the Act in 1943.08 A few states may
have adopted marriage evasion statutes other than the Uniform Act, and a few court decisions may be interpreted as
adopting a marriage evasion policy without the aid of statute,"0 9 but the movement seems to have gained only slight
momentum. As already noted, there are no Wyoming statutes
which can be interpreted as adopting a marriage evasion
policy, and when confronted with a case which presented a
perfect opportunity for judicial adoption of such a policy,
the Supreme Court of Wyoming declined the invitation.1 '
From this brief review there seems no reason to question
the soundness of the judgment of the Wyoming legislature
in selecting the orthodox conflict of laws rule to govern the
validity in Wyoming of marriages performed outside the
state. No extended discussion of the merits of the three rules
will be undertaken.
However, if we are to stay with the orthodox rule, Section 20-21 should be fleshed out in the interests of clarity.
We suggest that the period at the end of the section as it
now stands be changed to a comma, and the following words
added:
unless any such marriage be deemed contrary to the
strong public policy of Wyoming, in which event it
106. Cases pro and con are cited in 35 AM. JUR. Marriage § 169, at 285 (1941).
107. Brook v. Brook, 9 H.L.C. 193 (1861).
108. JACOBS & J. GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 72 (4th ed. 1961).
109. Id.

110. Hoagland v. Hoagland, 27 Wyo. 178, 193 P. 843, 32 A.L.R. 1104 (1920).
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shall be void in this state. Without intending this
reference to be exclusive, all marriages designated
as void by the statutes of this state if performed in
Wyoming shall be deemed contrary to the strong
public policy of Wyoming. All marriages contracted
outside this state which would be either void or
voidable by the laws of the state or country where
contracted shall be void in all courts and places in
this state.
The words "strong public policy" were chosen rather
than "public policy" alone so as to exclude a category of
marriages (e.g., underage marriages) which may not be
completely valid if performed in Wyoming, hence are against
the public policy of Wyoming in one sense of the term, and
yet are not so offensive to our public policy as to be entirely
repugnant thereto. The "strong public policy" language
gives the court desirable leeway in considering the validity
of out-of-state marriages which were valid where performed
but would encounter at least some disapproval if attempted
in Wyoming.
The next-to-last sentence is the suggested addition to
Section 20-21 is designed to take care of such situations as
are exemplified by the case of Garcia v. Garcia."' South
Dakota statutes provided that marriages between first cousins would be incestuous and void if performed within the
state, and that the parties to incestuous marriages would be
guilty of adulty, a felony punishable by a maximum of 10
years in the penitentiary. (First cousin marriages performed
in Wyoming are also void.)". The Garcias, who were first
cousins, were married in California, where such marriages
are valid, and later moved to South Dakota. The wife brought
suit to annul the marriage. The Supreme Court of South
Dakota held the marriage valid in that state, on the ground
that the marriage was valid where performed and did not
offend the strong public policy of South Dakota because
it was not incestuous "according to the accepted opinion of
Christendom""' (Incestuous marriages as set forth in the
Book of Leviticus do not include first cousin marriages.)
It is difficult to imagine a clearer expression of strong
111. Garcia v. Garcia, 25 S.D. 645, 127 N.W. 586 (1910).
112. WYo. STAT. § 20-32 (1956).
113. Garcia v. Garcia, supra note 111, at 589.
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public policy than the designation of a certain kind of marriage as void, plus a ten year prison sentence for those who
participate therein! If the legislature of Wyoming has seen
fit to designate certain kinds of marriages as void when
performed here, it seems to us that the strong public policy
of Wyoming on that subject has been expressed-and for
this reason we have suggested the addition to Section 20-21
of the provision that "marriages designated as void by the
statutes of this state if performed in Wyoming shall be
deemed contrary to the strong public policy of Wyoming."
Not all states would follow this philosophy, as the Garcia
case1 4 so well demonstrates.
In Part III of this article there will be an analysis of
such Wyoming statutes other than Sections 20-1 to 20-21 as
apply directly to marriage. This will be followed by a proposed revision of the Wyoming "Marriage Code".

114. ;d.
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